Reshaping the network to allow for more contributors


#1

Abstract

The current system doesn’t make a lot of sense. P-reps are being payed based on the number of votes which clearly doesn’t work. Asking people to distrubute votes only goes so far, imagine if the ecosystem was 10x bigger. How centralized wouldn’t that be? Right now people may care about decentralization, but I can assure everyone that as things grow, centralization becomes a bigger issue- not a smaller one. Bitcoin is the prime example that now has 4 pools controlling > 51% of the network.

Identifying the issue

I have tried to think about how things could get better, but as long as the top P-rep teams are getting insane rewards, there is some serious incentive to run a staking service and give the rewards back to equity holders. Things look like they may be shaping for the better but I strongly don’t think so and the sole reason we don’t have more centralization is due to the ecosystem being small, and voting biases being pursused to make things look better than they are.

Voting Bias

Certain whales, unsure who, is selecting P-reps to ensure decentralization. Let’s say for a second that Min Kim is the one behind decentralization. Without people like him we are not even close to having 22 main P-reps, but rather 5 P-reps. This doesn’t scale. We don’t have 100 Min Kims that will vote for decentralization.

Solution

The P-reps are obtaining too much rewards. The voting system has important utilities, but comes with too much responsibility. The solution will be keeping the voting system, however letting P-reps work for their rewards. The more hashrate you produce, the more rewards you will receive. If you are in the top 22 you will receive extra rewards over the Sub-preps to prevent bad actors from having a voice.

To clarify: In order to prevent decentralization, you get the same rewards being number 1 as well as being number 22. If you are number 23 you will make less.

So instead of getting rewards purely based on your votes, you will have to be in the top 22 AND grinding rewards; the more power you put in the engine, the faster it goes (the more you make).

Sumarize

This solution helps secure the network with more power as long as there is incentive for it. P-reps will only have to run a node and can delegate rewards to EEP’s and DBP’s as their two sole responsibilities. They can submit their own proposals if they want to contribute as well, But Aren’t Getting The Same Rewards As Everyone For Doing Nothing But Running A Node.

After reading this again I felt a need to say this in different words: Instead of competing for votes as the primary drive, you are instead competing for hashrate similar to Bitcoin; However you still need to be in the top 22 in order to receive the rewards in the first place. This is mostly an idea to counter centralization. I don’t think there are many other good ways getting around the fact that P-reps are willing to make multiple nodes to counter any action against centralization being taken.


#2

I hate the idea of DQ’ing P-reps for those “only” securing the network. They should have the ability to just do that, and shouldn’t be obligied to contribute. Contributions should come in the form of EEP’s and DBP’s.

I am up for debating the solution, but I think we all can agree on the issue that we have.

Just to clarify once more the issue incase someone didn’t understand.

If a Staking service can get in the top 22 through giving all the block rewards of let’s say $30k a month ontop of the voting rewards, then those voters gets more than everyone else. This is a serious issue and overtime we will see more and more equity P-reps.

Asking P-reps to not Vote Buy is inefficient. Any P-rep that chooses to contribute will suffer a great loss if he doesn’t get votes. Let’s take Reliant Node as an example. They wrote a nice looking wallet for free and are ranked 40. They lose money by contributing. How is that a good system?