IISS Enhancements


#14

I appreciate the discussion. I think some good points have been brought up on both sides. Things can always be improved but I’m happy with the launch thus far and I think ICON designed a very good system and I think we should not rush to make major changes. Over the past several months, P-Reps have brought lots of excitement, marketing, community involvement, DApps, tools, and more to ICON. Most importantly, we helped in testnet and launch the decentralized network. Much of this without getting paid, as pay is within the last month.

I would like to stress that large scale changes such as this should be thought through very carefully. I think we really need to hear from ICON about what their thoughts are of the system. They spent over a year designing the system and I think overall it’s a great system that rewards contribution. We need to hear what they think of it thus far and how they think it will be in the future. If they think it’s good, then perhaps we leave it as is and let it grow. If they think it’s not good, then why? And what is different in the first month than what they were expecting that is causing it to not be good? Making large changes to the whole system in this way comes across as throwing in the towel on proof of contribution and saying it didn’t work, because essentially we would have a proof of stake network if p reps are only block producers. I think the system is working well already and is only going to improve with time as more p reps join. I think we need to give it a chance to show the success of the new system of proof of contribution. Perhaps time will show it’s a great system or perhaps it will show it’s not a great system. Maybe it’s better to have a POS system that rewards investors who just want to run a node. P reps can still do this- they just likely won’t get much voter support. Maybe POC is better in that it inspires p reps to do more than run a node? Time will tell.

As others have stated, if vote concentration is the only potential issue, then there are some potential solutions. I do agree vote concentration is an issue and we should try to help. One such solution is ICON spreading votes as their 24M self stake is a major cause for the top spot being skewed. This could also help lower teams catch up a bit and if done in a public manner based on a modeled curve, I believe it would be fair. In addition, I think the modification to rewards warrants discussion. But I think modifying to reduce by the square root is too much. While the top 2 teams have significant self votes, voters clearly show strong support for many teams at the top. This is based on the time, effort, and trust many of these teams have built. Fair elections and varying rewards are capitalist, and I think that is good for bringing out the best. I would support a smaller factor to even things out though. Perhaps a factor of raising rewards to the 0.75, rather than 0.5 (square root).

I agree that EEP and DBP will require changes to the system to properly work. But I don’t think bringing P-Reps down to only being block producers is the right answer. Perhaps if this was the plan all along, but it wasn’t how this was portrayed or marketed. So why have a year of campaign and base everything on proof of contribution, only to step back and change things a month after decentralization? If this was the plan, then it should have been stated as such. And maybe this is a better plan, to have p reps as only block producers, and leave contribution to EEP and DBP, but that’s not how the system was portrayed for the last year, and I don’t think a rapid change would be healthy. There certainly will need to be some changes to ensure p reps, EEPs, and DBP operate in harmony, but they should be slow and calculated. I think the most difficult thing in all of this is knowing what we as p reps should plan for? We made a proposal based on the system, but the fact that all of these massive changes are being considered makes it prudent to be very cautious to start efforts that may be changed due to a massive overhaul of the system very soon. Stability encourages growth and I think sticking with a good system is better than changing often to perfect to a great system.


#15

Thanks everybody for the feedback! People are making good points and I appreciate the collaborative effort to make IISS the best it can be. A few things I want to note just to reel in this conversation a bit.

  1. The Long Term Solution - As stated in the title, this is a long term solution to enhance IISS. I have always viewed the current version of IISS as a first stage of decentralization, where we would work together to further decentralize the network. This is something that would not be feasible to implement anytime soon, so for all of you concerned that I am trying to make massive changes just a month into decentralization, rest assured this will not happen. Given that it’s been about a month, I think it is fair to start aggregating some of the current issues/feedback and exploring potential solutions.

  2. I want to clarify that my first post is meant to be a starting point. To make this thread more productive, let’s try to focus responses on this thread to asking questions about the initial post, proposing tweaks to the initial post, proposing new concerns about IISS, and/or proposing an alternative solution to the issues outlined in the original post. For example, if you have an issue with something in the original post, try your best to both raise the issue and propose a solution. Of course, if you believe the current system is as you would want it, then feel free to express that opinion as well (as some already have).

  3. Overall, the goal I am shooting for is to solve the issues outlined in the original post via protocol level adjustments to limit the necessity of off-chain intervention, create a truly decentralized network that could one day be used by enterprises to leverage the benefits of public blockchain, and create an on-chain and decentralized system to reward direct contributions to this open source project while protecting against gaming the system. I would say this has always been the goal, and that the current system has a few holes worth exploring solutions for.


#16

How can this be a good thing we need decentralization. In current stacking incentive 5 p-reps own 51% of the power. This is the opposite of decentralization and still and always will be the single most dangerous situation in any crypto project. With this proposal we enhance decentralization and lower power of P-reps and self voted in p-reps. Today number 1 generates more than 20x the cost for running a node at max price, and we know how they got there. Not by big contributions, but by big bags.

At all time high prices current payout model would surpass current trading volume. This is not a question of should we fix it. but how fast can we do it


#18

As an opinion towards the original proposal by @Benny_Options Im kinda split… I think that such system might be useful, but for an entirely different reason:

The idealist in me loves the idea behind all the preps contributing and 100 teams (or more) working towards the chain progress.

In practice though the situation is quite different though: one month into decentralization and we have most prep teams struggling to even cover their server expenses while at the same time, we are yet to see any of the top prep teams that are way overfunded at this point (according to what they have expected prior to decentralization and according to the resources that they receive compared to what they are releasing) to release even a plan or a statement on what they are currently using those resouses on and how do they justify receiving so much aside from ‘we have invested money so far and we need salaries’. Nobody clarified prior to decentralization that what was stated as ‘we are investing time and resourses out of our own pocket to show our commitment and becuase we believe in the system’, would have to be repaid or that a ‘6 month payment buffer’ might be needed before real work can be done even at a top level. I dont also agree that a simple plan of action could take a month - if this was a real job, that you are payed to do, you would be fired on the spot for something like that.

Honestly for most teams I am seeing less work done and less motivation compared prior to decentralization and this should not be the case. If the teams do not get themselves together and start proving that they all (and by all, I really mean it - including Icon Foundation, Velic, ICX Station, Symmetry etc etc) deserve that kind of funding and that they can use it to grow the network and do it asap (as each day that passes is a potential lost funding of preps that just decided to run nodes on that day), we can easily lower the rewards and switch to DPoS prep system.

I have an even better solution - if there are no results, we wait several months until Pocket/Figment’s citizen nodes project is done and we scrap the majority of preps althogether as we dont need sub-preps if they will not be contributing and if everyone can run a citizen node


#19

Thanks for initiating this debate @Benny_Options

I agree with the issues outlined and think the long-term solution is attractive on many points.

Most notably, it would create incentives for both Main P-Reps and Sub P-Reps to run a node, and re-equilibrate the balance between the top 5 and the rest of the participants. It will also lower incentives to vote buying, although I believe this is a fake problem at the moment, since everybody is aware of the risks of doing such, and P-Reps can submit a disqualification proposal in case it happens.

However, I believe that without an additional complementary mechanism, it would lower the motivation of each and every P-Rep to contribute to the network by doing something else than running a node. Under this model, there is less competition for voters, which means that some P-Reps could do very well just by running a node.

Regarding the long-term solution, I think the current IISS model is well-designed, and maybe that we could improve (i) the education of the community to decentralize (ii) the incentives towards decentralization.

While education can be done via blog articles and media communication, incentives could be set up so that Iconists decentralize their stake towards P-Reps with less votes. What kind of on-chain incentives could we implement?

  • Slightly higher rewards when voting for somebody with less vote %
  • Proportional slashing, meaning that voting for one of the Top P-Rep would carry an additional risk in case of downtime

In addition, in the short-term, an interesting solution would be to have the ICON Foundation spread their votes towards smaller P-Reps in order to support their activities.


#20

Simplest near term solution that will help is for icon to lower their self staked votes. They can lower this amount by 10M and still be in first place (I think icon is deserving and should be in first as the main contributor and creator of the network over the past two years). This will lower the gap and also increase % of lower teams by lowering total votes. Regarding the 24M of self staked icx, icon previously said “this amount will be carefully controlled because this amount should not affect the decentralization of the network.” I think it is time to control this amount and help the decentralization of the network. While this won’t solve all problems, it is a simple and quick fix that will certainly help. It also goes in line with the guidance icon previously gave and I would like to see them act on this. Then icon can adjust votes to ensure they remain at #1 as needed on a weekly or monthly basis. As I said, icon being #1 makes sense, but no need to be 5% ahead of #2 and double #3.


#21

Unfortunately, I disagree with the paradigm that the foundation is putting forth; it sounds very similar to a redistribution of wealth paradigm which is exactly the contrary of what this ecosystem was meant to be. It would be a shame if we went that route. We need to find another solution or create another solution at the protocol level, but not this one.

I hope this is reconsidered, at least if the protocol level is the way to solve it, we need the paradigm to be enticing for new P-Reps, we’re still 32 short of 100 P-Reps. P-Reps are allocated votes specifically by the ICONist. P-Reps should be transparent with their financial spending and that should be a protocol mandate to increase transparency so ICONists know where the money is going and can delegate their votes with a more cohesive and clarified vision of where the monetary consumption of P-Reps is going. I agree with the idea that P-Reps may take advantage and that’s where other noble P-Reps come in and set them straight, or at least try. We can agree that the redistribution of wealth and the destruction of monetary incentive is not only unproductive, but it will leave no room for economic incentive for new P-Reps, I know I said I’d support any decision, but this is a no no. I would prefer going Radiofriendly’s way and creating a “disciplinary rubric” so to say. This is more dangerous than ICON realizes, and besides, the P-Reps now are in charge of governance and developing the ICON Ecosystem and that cant be done with a lack of funding and I don’t think it’s fair that the foundation, who is the number one P-Rep with massive amounts of economic resources, is now trying to minimize the economic validity of P-Reps.
Truly, if ICONists disagree with how money is being spent by P-Reps, they should reallocate their votes, that sets enough of a precedent.

This is a digital decentralized democratic republic. We have to stop vote buying, that is a fact, but this protocol is not the way to go. It kills economic incentive, I would recommend we create a document of some type that mandates P-Rep economic transparency or something of that nature. That’ll also minimize controversy with the foundation among ICONist, a huge question the community asks is “where did the ICO Funds go?” That lack of transparency can be minimized if we create transparency reports that all P-Reps adhere to, including the foundation.

The only thing I can say to the foundation is this simple question: what if a governmental entity came in and decreed that you had to have a cap on your financial resources that was given willingly by the community? Not only would that cause a detrimental economic ripple effect in your company it would bring in the question of economic survival as a private entity.


#22

I want to highlight that I whole-heartily appreciate this discussion. These discussions are the foundations of nation building and the construction of infrastructure. So I truly am grateful that you started this discussion Benny Options :+1:.


#23

Hey Corey,

Thanks for the response and I’m glad you appreciate the debate. I want to clarify a few things and respond to a few of your points below:

1.) Lack of P-Reps: I would argue that part of the reason we are not at 100 nodes is the massive barrier to entry we have self-imposed to our network. This is not the fault of the community or P-Rep teams, but an unforeseen consequence to the design of IISS. The current system incentivizes an immense amount of time to be spent garnering votes from the community on social media, and incentivizes attacks on teams that are not meeting a subjective benchmark of contribution. In my proposed system, somebody that wants to contribute would simply submit a Contribution Proposal and wait for ICX holders to either approve or reject. Somebody that wants to run a node would just buy enough ICX to be in the top 100 and start running a node, or, if they want, try to convince people to vote for them instead of risking their own capital. The current barrier to entry is much higher than on other networks. High barrier to entry in our early days is detrimental to the growth of our network and community.

2.) Communism: I think you are missing some key aspects of the proposal. There is still an economic incentive to become a block producing Main P-Rep (need more votes/ICX for this), and also an economic incentive to set up more nodes (need a certain amount of votes/ICX to qualify). Equal rewards for all Sub P-Reps does not mean equal rewards per entity. Entities can set up multiple Sub P-Reps to earn more rewards if they have enough ICX/votes. More ICX holdings/votes = more nodes = more money. There is also a scarcity to the number of nodes (currently 100, but could also be changed), so the barrier to entry on the ICON Network will then be equal to the cost of the ICX delegation to node 100. If node number 100 has 1 million ICX delegated to it, then the barrier to entry to our network will be 1 million ICX.

3.) I think you are missing what I mean by protocol level adjustments. Creating rules and regulations and turning P-Reps into police/judges/courts is not a decentralized autonomous network. It is a network that requires regular human intervention/oversight to maintain best practices. There is no reasonable way at the network layer to autonomously force P-Reps to produce some sort of meaningful transparency report. Instead of creating off-chain policies and turning P-Reps into police/judges/courts, we need to create a protocol that does not require enforcement by humans. We need a protocol that incentivizes the actions that we want, this is the purpose of cryptoeconomics in a blockchain network. What we want is a secure/stable/decentralized blockchain and contribution to the ecosystem. While many P-Reps may still choose to contribute in this different system, I would expect many people (myself and yourself included) to defer to the Contribution Proposal System to get funding for projects/initiatives to help grow the ICON Ecosystem. ICON Core is a good example of something that would instead request funding from the network via the Contribution Proposal System. Another good example is your podcasts - you would submit a proposal for weekly podcasts and, if approved by ICX holders, receive steady ICX payments for your work. Direct rewards for direct contributions.


#24

If so, how is it different from current model ? Decentralization means more nodes controlled by more unique entities. Especially for main validators.
With the new model, a single entity can control multiple nodes and leech ICX by doing

  • Buy enough ICX and take over top position ( same as self-vote )
  • Do whatever it take to attract vote from community ( exactly what happened with current model, but worse with new model because that entity doesn’t even need to be bothered with contribution and policed by other PReps at all )

The most important point is, assume we reach 100 nodes, but if those nodes are controlled by a very small group of entities, it is still very centralized, nothing change.

I know you are trying to take mechanism from other chains and apply to ICON, but it is not that simple. Equal reward works in other chains with many other conditions and ICON hasn’t satisfied them yet ( e.g. high number of main validators ).
It is like picking some good component of a system and put it to other system, and expect them to work. No, it probably cannot work like that. The system must be well-designed from the beginning with fit-together gears.

By the way, I didn’t even mention potential failure of Contribution Proposal System if it still use the same voting mechanism as PRep election.


#25

Thanks for chiming in. Perhaps I’m missing something but regarding the proposed:

1: This appears to be like the same system we have today. One can buy votes or get votes through work, which is essentially what the system is today. There would just be a cap at which an increase in the number of votes does not add profit. I think this adds more issues (outlines in 2)

2: This seems much worse than the current system. If we incentivize people to make more nodes, then whales with self votes could take over the entire network… because you can spread votes. You can’t spread votes from the community. Ubik would have 16M votes for 1 node and teams with significant self stake would have 1M for 10 nodes and have 10x the profits and 10x the governing votes with less overall votes? binance velic icon and whales would control all. Then they can vote for their own proposals and control the entire system. From a technical perspective, teams running multiple nodes hurts decentralization. If two teams run 50 nodes, then that essentially is just 2 clusters with high centrality performing all of the blockchain work. If a whale can easily spread votes and put all their nodes in the same location, I think we will very quickly have a centralized network with a few kingpins controlling it behind many nodes that they own.

  1. I don’t think we have appropriate technology to fully self govern. Some areas can, but many cannot be written into code. That is why p reps are needed and trusted by the people to make appropriate decisions. Some can be automated, but much cannot. I believe we need written rules and associated penalties, and then it makes the voting much simpler. Perhaps some automation could occur, but I believe p reps main duty is governance.

#26

Hey buddy! First and foremost I want to thank you for taking the time to outline the intricate components of this proposal; it truly means a lot not only for me but the entirety of the community. I appreciate you outlining these distinguishing factors of this proposal, I will humbly say I didn’t think of it this way and I whole heartily appreciate you chiming in. Thank you so much for this, it makes a lot more sense now on my end. I always appreciate your diligence, patience and contributions. Cheers and thank you again for the clarification!


#27

Thanks for chiming in, Scott.

1/ On this point, I agree that there is a relatively high barrier of entry for grassroots teams to attract votes from the community as you touched on. However, this is something that was openly encouraged for several months - for P-Rep candidates to market and differentiate themselves in a competitive atmosphere. In fact, it was one of the main themes of ICONSENSUS. This is a direct function of the system ICON designed and marketed openly for several months.

Additionally, competition is not necessarily a bad thing, at least I don’t think. It brings out the best in people and I’m not sure how this would be accomplished in a system where there is virtually none. There will also not be that large of an economic incentive to run a node as rewards would be disproportionate to a P-Rep’s votes, nearly identical across the board. So, in terms of attracting more P-Reps, I think this would have a negative impact on current and future ones. Current ones will have to scale down their teams and they are likely already amidst financial uncertainty as this proposal is being discussed.

Under your new proposed system, you also mention the issuance of “Contribution Proposals”. Will this not overlap with EEP/DBP’s?

Under the current system, P-Reps are incentivized to contribute to the network in ways outside of the minimum requirement of running a node. While running a P-Rep node is undoubtedly the most important requirement, it feels like the design of the system has been skewed and we’re attempting to “gut” the very thing that sets P-Reps apart from other DPoS based networks - Contribution. In fact, under DPoC, ICON’s consensus model variant it places vast importance on “contribution” outside of being strictly a validator as opposed to other DPoS based blockchain networks (Lisk, Bitshares, EOS, etc).

The central philosophy of the ICON Network reward distribution is fair compensation based on relative contribution. Each participant can demonstrate their contribution through the ICON Network’s unique contribution evaluation system. In the end, contribution is the most important value shared within the ICON Network, and therefore will be the sole standard in the network. Delegated Proof of Contribution (DPoC), as described herein, is the sole justification for electing representatives.

The above quotation was taken from Ricky Dodds medium post earlier this year going in-depth on DPoC.

To move from this initial conception and propose major changes to the roles and responsibilities of P-Reps seems a bit misleading for all the teams who were heavily involved in marketing themselves, engaging with the community, and even being apart of the ambassador program - spreading these same initial ideals across several different content mediums and audiences.

I’m not sure if that’s the best way to go.

2/ I feel providing the means for P-Reps to set up more nodes is attempting to solve a problem of scarcity of the number of P-Reps by diluting currently existing ones. This can have some negative impacts as @thelionshire pointed out, including but not limited to heavy centralization.

We are already facing a problem of centralization as the top 3 main P-Reps all have ICON affiliations and/or partnerships. The number of votes proportionate to these entities accounts for roughly 37% of all votes. Additionally, the top-ranked team (ICON Foundation) has nearly double the amount of votes as the 3rd ranked team - ICX_Station.

Without intending on sounding like a broken record, this is hurting decentralization at the moment and a few solutions have been proposed to combat this problem and aid decentralization of our network. For the most part, I haven’t seen any discussion on the solutions proposed outside of yourself in ICON related social channels.

I would like to hear more discussion on this from the Foundation.

Additionally, a "protocol level solution" could be considered to combat the problem of vote disparity and incentivize ICONists to not delegate towards larger P-Reps. This has been a topic of relevance recently in networks like Cosmos and Ethereum. "Proportional Slashing" could very well encourage distribution of votes to lower-ranking teams who will not suffer as high of a penalty as those higher ranking. While the "burn" is not currently active for main P-Reps, it could be something to consider as it will hurt larger P-Reps more and incentivize ICONists to distribute their votes to teams who would not suffer as high of "slash" under various circumstances.

These penalties will likely not be very often but I believe it is something of equal consideration to take into account.

Links:

3/ I just suggested a protocol level adjustment above but, @thelionshire’s point holds here, in my opinion.

I don’t think we have appropriate technology to fully self govern. Some areas can, but many cannot be written into code. That is why p reps are needed and trusted by the people to make appropriate decisions. Some can be automated, but much cannot. I believe we need written rules and associated penalties, and then it makes the voting much simpler. Perhaps some automation could occur, but I believe p reps main duty is governance.

Proof-of-Stake is still new, this is further evident by PoS based blockchain networks accounting for roughly 5% of overall market capitalization. Many are experimental models.

Money can pay for development of any project that sits in a repo. To foster collaboration is difficult though, which makes experimentation important. The P-Rep system in ICON seeks to encourage validators to lead on these community-oriented projects.

Furthermore, as @thelionshire pointed out, the technology is just not there for a fully autonomous Digital Nation. AI is based on rules, you can have self-learning networks, but at the end of the day, behaviors need to be defined by an algorithm.

As you yourself have stated in the past @Benny_Options, P-Reps should focus on price and short-term solutions to grow the network. I’m unsure how this can be followed if the P-Reps are “stripped” of their duties in governance and contribution.


#28

Don’t really see the issue here. Spreading your votes around means you can run more nodes but that doesn’t mean you will participate in governance since that is restricted to the top 22 spots. A single entity running multiple nodes is still possible in the current system so I don’t really see the concern here. A whale with 10 M ICX can split his votes and take spots 8 and 9. I’m all for many people running nodes and there shouldn’t be a cap on that. Individuals who spread around their votes are doing so at a cost. They have to purchase the tokens to do so. The two main issues with the current system are; ‘contribution’ and vote concentration at the top (Big issue since network resources are concentrated at the top). The current system doesn’t resolve these issues. Since we are now dealing with hypotheticals, whales in the current system don’t even have to write a proposal. They can buy themselves in and contribute as little as possible with no accountability while earning bulk of the reward for dev’t. At least with the new model, they have to make a proposal with expectations if they choose to contribute and ICONist will have a say with their votes. The current system just relies on faith/trust in a few teams which is risky. Many people believe VELIC isn’t doing enough with the rewards they are receiving. This is because the current system doesn’t require them to do anything. They can run a node and still claim they are ‘contributing’. I’ve seen UBIK propose that a 3 month report should be a requirement. If I report on how I’m maintaining my node, wouldn’t that satisfy this requirement? Or will I face DQ if my contribution doesn’t meet the criteria of a few teams at the top. What happens if i choose to not submit anything at all since I don’t need votes and voted myself in. Plus just like Benny indicated, barrier to entry is high. Some want to just run a node with no ‘contribution’ so why force them to ‘contribute’.


#29

First, if you notice, you will see that top 3 P-Reps are ICON-affiliated. Just do the math

  • ICON Foundation 17%
  • VELIC 11.3%
  • ICX Station 9%

The sum is 17 + 11.3 + 9 = 37.3% which is a LOT.
Yeah, ICON themselves take a big responsibility in causing top concentration of vote. They must do their duty of reducing stake rate first, then suggesting other teams.

What prevent one entity from running multiple nodes in top22 ? Assume that entity has a lot of votes, by doing that they can gain more both profit and power.
Also, even if they run multiple nodes in sub 22, it still negatively affects the decentralization of the whole network. What we really need is more unique entities rather than more nodes.

See ?, we all know current model has its own issue, but the new one cannot solves those issues at all, it even comes with potential worse issues. At least, the number of main Preps must be increased significantly in order to consider new model ( harder to take over top22 )

For unreasonable high reward of top Preps, we just need a better distribution formula, like square root function approach proposed by Scott Smiley.

Contribution Proposal System still requires trust, community will be probably the one judging proposals, and they must trust proposer as well ( even for teams with clear milestones and track record ). As I said, issues of Prep election will very likely repeat themselves again. Especially with simple voting system and UX of voting tool.


#31

Like i stated earlier, an entity running multiple nodes doesn’t guarantee they will get into the top 22 and participate in governance. Also, they are doing so at a cost. Plus, this is possible even in the current system and we cannot prove that all 68 P-reps currently runnings are unique. For someone to do this, it requires capital. Its not free. A single entity can run multiple nodes on any chain on the market assuming its permissionless so I don’t see how that is an issue when the current system allows it.

I don’t see how ICON spreading around their vote (picking winners and losers) solves the ‘contribution’ issue neither does a new distribution formula. Unless we are willing to accept that P-reps in the top spots can make the bulk of network resources and contribute as little as possible or nothing at all. These issues are bound to happen. At that point, why not just call it a proof of stake rather than a proof of contribution. Why force people to write proposals about contribution also.

With Trust/Faith, at least with the new system, teams who fail to deliver could face rejection from ICONist with their next proposal so it won’t be in their best interest to do nothing. With the current system, a whale who votes himself into the top spot can choose to contribute or not and there is nothing no one can do about it unless the other P-reps are willing to DQ people who fail to ‘contribute’. Which will be terrible for ICX. I guess my whole point is there is no accountability in the current system. We are just at the mercy of P-rep candidates and take whatever they give while having no power to remove them if they act in their interest rather than the network. A viable ecosystem should have checks and balances.

When big exchanges and self voted whales move in and take up the top spots, this will become an issue. I strongly believe that most of the inflation rewards should go towards development, which ICONist will have a say with the new system. The current system basically comes down to giving someone your money and hoping for the best.


#32

I assume they get enough votes. Of course everything has its cost, with current model PRep must convince community or buy ICX to self-vote. Same to new model.

Again, I never said current model is better, but the new model is not superior either. They are probably come with the same set of issues.

It is about the limit number of main validator slots, of course one entity can run multiple nodes, but if there is more slots, it is harder to take all top positions. Same happened to EOS with only 21 main validators.

Actually they should unstake some of their ICX rather than vote any teams. The effect of concentration is mostly caused by them. At least, doing that should help.

You totally forgot community ? After several months, if top PReps don’t do any significant thing, community will likely notice and remove their votes. Unless majority of ICONists don’t care at all, in this case, the new model will not work either.

It definitely is Proof of Stake, every chains with staking mechanism are proof of stake by nature. For specific chain, the concept of Proof of “some fancy name” is just extra protocol on top of PoS that help to mitigate caveat of PoS.

ICONist can also do exactly that do non-contributing PReps. What is new here ?

With new model, whale can also buy ICX and vote for their own proposals, nothing changes again.

Why no accountability ?, if you can prove that some specific PRep is acting in its interest, just do it and community will take action. Again, if ICONists don’t care, it is pointless, even with new model.

With new model, big exchange can still do exactly what they can do with current model, even easier ( not being policed and DQ at all ). They will vote for their own proposals, and easily take over top22 with their money. No offense here, but I can’t believe you don’t see that.

All ICONists do have a say with current model, it is their votes. Again, if you can prove that some PReps are bad actors, just tell community and see what happen. Just a hint, actually we already have one supposed-to-be “bad actor” ( you know which PRep I mean ), and NOTHING HAPPENED so far.
That is it, ICONists are very apathy.

Let’s put an end here, we are all hoping for the best, same with new model. Contribution Proposal System still require ICONists to trust proposer, and hope they will deliver. Proposer could fool community to get funded and deliver nothing ( same to PReps election ). Why can’t you get this point ?


In my conclusion, you just overrate community and ICONists, but ignore the fact they are apathy as well as easily get fooled by clever PR and sweet promises. That is why I believe the new model can’t work because it relies on the same people - ICONists - to decide reward allocation.


#33

Great conversation going on here.

I want to take a step back and discuss the objectives of these changes before getting too deep into specifics of what would be done.

In my mind we have a few issues:

1) Problem:
Community/Development focused P-Reps (that are reliant on votes for funding) need more income. P-Reps that have been in the ecosystem for a while have name recognition and votes already after the months/years of community work/participation. Without a lot of new investment it makes it hard(er) to garner votes. PARROT9’s vote total is evidence enough though that some teams can overcome this (marketing focused ones at least).

Some thoughts towards a solution:
Attract new investors/voters ie up our staking %. Revote every 6 months for P-Reps? Ie all votes are taken down and every team is at zero. All ICONists could then vote from a RANDOMISED list of P-Rep names. This combats apathy and will make ICONists vote. This event could also have bonus ICX rewards for ICONists who vote within the first week or two after the revote ie it could be a marketing tool.

Secondly I think block production rewards need to be higher. Let’s stop them being pegged to I-Rep and just make a flat USD figure of what it was advertised as in ICONSENSUS elections of $10, 000 USD a month. That’s enough for a group of devs to be paid properly for part/full time work and to cover expenses. We should also expand block production beyond the top 22 P-Reps so that lower ranked/newer dev teams can also budget on receiving partial block production rewards.

If we did this then I-Rep could be lowered substantially to decrease Representative rewards and balance out inflationary pressure. We can also use our network’s USD-ICX price oracle to achieve this on chain.

2) Problem:
We are not decentralised enough.

Solution ideas:
Time. We have decentralised block production and thus we are decentralised. HOWEVER ICON leads our network currently. This is not something we can change imho, but I also see it as far more of an asset. ICON and ICONloop are our network’s creator and basic bread winners. Mid/Long term our public chain needs to become free of ICON’s dominant leadership, but we want ICONloop . Does absolutely no one else remember ICONs DEX wallet either? Theoretically they can take over most of the network voting power if they used it, but that’s the exact opposite of what ICON has shown it wants to do imho.

4) Problem:
P-Rep roles not clearly defined. We also don’t have C-Rep nodes yet. C-Rep’s are/were a possible way to separate ‘passive’ and ‘active’ ICON nodes. Required of an active P-Rep should be: network participation in the form of development work on our network and participation in governance. P-Reps will naturally bring extra assets to bare too (ie for ICONation I’m bringing ICON community management as well as working to empower/assist our developers and grow our network).

As well as active P-Reps we also want to have passive nodes because they secure our network/lock up ICX supply. The issue with them though is that we can’t justify paying them the same block production rewards as P-Rep developer teams working on the network.

Solution ideas:
We need to find a way to balance/lower passive self funded node rewards whilst also keeping them high/competitive with the market. At the same time we need to be mindful about adding any complications for investors, complications will turn away investors. So why not have a similar calculation for C-Reps as P-Reps but add a modifier for C-Reps such as was suggested from Scott above.

5) Problem:
Money+Voting > Human Voting Power. Whales can overrun the network in theory.

Solution Ideas:
In the future use MyID/DPASS DID tech to vote on DBPs and EEPs. This will require a world wide recognised standard too ie no dodgy websites being used to create multiple personal voting DIDs. We should all still be able to retain our anonymity in a vote, yet know each other voting are not bots/multiple accounts.


#34

I’ll be a bit more clear here. What about P-reps who do not need community votes? I’m talking about P-reps who bought their way into the top here. As the network grows, we will see more of these p-reps show up. Even the P-reps who need votes now may not need it in the near future since many are re-staking their rewards to maintain their spot.

If so, why create barriers to entry and require P-reps to create proposals if you believe its a POS model. We could make the process a lot easier for many to enter and less messy if we remove all the ambiguities associated with Proof of contribution such as proposals and requiring P-reps to contribute to the network. We could make ‘contribution’ a voluntary thing. At that point, a P-rep candidate wouldn’t need hundreds of thousands of dollars just to run a node. Those funds could go to build the ecosystem and ICONist will have a say as to what those funds should be used for.

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No they can’t. In the current model, ICONist only have a say if the P-rep needs votes from them. They can’t do anything if the P-rep has enough money to buy his way to the top.

Yes they can but their vote would go up against the vote of the entire network at this point. As you clearly stated, with the new model, they are at least creating a proposal to contribute something so being active. The current model doesn’t require them to do anything unless other P-reps are willing to disqualify them if the contribution doesn’t fit the criteria of the other p-reps.

Same as the response above. They can’t do anything if that P-rep doesn’t need their votes.

I believe I’ve answered this already in the comments above. First we acknowledge they are making an effort to contribute by submitting a contribution proposal which in of itself is a win. Second, every ICONist will have the opportunity to vote on their proposal so their vote will pale relative the entire network, unless you are making the assumption that the whale has more votes than the entire ICX amount staked. With the current system, this same whale doesn’t even have to lift a finger since they aren’t required to do so. I hope you can see the difference here.

ICONist don’t have much of a say if the P-rep doesn’t need their votes. Hope I’ve clarified this in my past comments. The P-rep could be sustaining his node with his own funds or ICONist still support that p-rep so I don’t agree with the apathy statement.

At least there are safe guards with the new model. It will not be in the interest of a P-rep to submit a proposal of contribution and not deliver. Why? ICONist would vote down his next contribution proposal. With the current model, this same P-rep doesn’t even have to submit a proposal and isn’t accountable to any one. ICONist have no say. I don’t get the point because to me its waste of network resources to pay someone a large amount for doing nothing while that money could go to hard working individuals who want to contribute. The current system is an Oligarchy system. We’ve seen many chains being abused with such a model and that is why in my opinion, the current model is on the same path. In my opinion, IISS should be about merit, not how many ICX you have if we want it to work for the entire network and not a few at the top.

There is no over-rating and I’ve explained why it won’t be in the interest for a P-rep to submit a contribution proposal and do nothing above. At least we’ve acknowledged they are making an effort to contribute by submitting the proposal. With the current system, they don’t have to even do that. We can see the clear differences between the two models. Again, the new model has checks and balances. There is accountability. Current model has no accountability. Its just giving someone resources, burying your face in the sand and hoping for the best.


#35

If you are concerned about those PRep leeching a lot of reward, a simple change in reward distribution formula is enough, something like square root function mentioned by Scott. No need for changing the whole system.

It is true, I get your point. Proof of Contribution is just a concept and should not be forced, that is why we need to discuss about current model. We could have a simple approach here

  • For PReps that want to contribution, very good, community should vote more for them
  • For non-contributing PReps and just want to run node, it is fine, community should not vote for them at all because they probably buy enough ICX. In order to prevent this kind of PReps from leeching too much reward, we just need to change reward distribution formula as said above

If so, in new model, self-staked PReps could easily push their own Contribution Proposals for their benefit without any votes from community as well. In either model, self-staked PReps don’t need community votes.

I think they are not much different, the outcome is still the same and submitter/proposer could easily get funded/reward that way. It doesn’t take much effort to submit a proposal, especially dummy proposals because they don’t need to make their proposals well-planned and reasonable at all, they will self-vote their proposals anyway.

Same for new model, proposers don’t care about ICONist’s opinion of their proposals because they will self-vote for their contribution proposals.

A dummy proposal is merely pointless.

Problems like voter’s apathy, random vote, or vote for top-only will probably happen again.

Why do you think proposers will need vote if they can self-vote for their proposals ? Apathy here means percentage of staked ICX in total supply is not high enough for overweighting self-staked Preps.

Again and again, whale with enough ICX don’t need community votes, he just simply self-vote his proposals. In both models, ICONists have no control over whales.

If you value meritocracy, we need a better and stronger model. Your new model is not good enough to be honest, with many loopholes like current one. If there is no mechanism to prevent whale from self-voting proposal, nothing change.

First, I need to repeat that dummy proposals is very insignificant. We need good proposals with real execution, not just proposal for the sake of proposal. We will see dummy proposals if proposer don’t need community votes.
Second, accountability as you said is very vague and in some case ( whale proposers with a lot of ICX ), it doesn’t work at all.