Our stance from the beginning is that to improve the DPoC model, all ecosystem problems need to be addressed. We have a strong belief that a combination of IISS, CPF and PoC variables is needed to solve the centralization and vote distribution, transparency and accountability and finally the voter’s apathy.
The proposed IISS is a step in a good direction and while it may not be addressing all of the problems, it is a way forward and a sign that Foundation is aware of the situation and most importantly willing to act to improve it.
We have strong support for a higher fee as we believe a strong initiative is needed to divert the P-Reps and contribution seekers to the CPF. CPF is a backbone of the system and it will stimulate teams to provide a better, more transparent and accountable project and overall business plan.
The proposed changes to the fund fee did surprise us a lot, especially after going through the numbers. To be honest, we were expecting more of the cosmetic changes not a solution like this. We are positively surprised by the bold move of foundation to go straight after the B1 rewards and redirect them into the fund. This has our full support as it is a clear sign Foundation is ready to do what is right for the ecosystem. Well done guys!
The bond requirement has our support from the start. It is a great initiative to rule out a lot of potential bad actors from the game. We were supporting the higher bond requirement, the one that relates to the higher period needed for a node to generate the required amount of reward ICX. We don’t mind going up to 12% bond which would represent a year-long reward commitment. Why such a high bond %? The only reason is to provide extra stimulation for the P-Reps to go through the CPF to fund their projects. As mentioned before, we don’t lack the funds, we are lacking good ideas and the projects.
This may be the only part of the proposal we are unsure about. While we support removing the 6% burn fee from the voters, we are unsure if the governance slashing is the right way to go. We have a strong belief a DPoC model should be more focused to stimulate the contribution and not try to penalize the lack of it. We will look forward to seeing other available options to get around this problem. Our best intention would be to stimulate the passive voters to be more included in the voting process and let them penalize the teams absent from the governance process.
To include the voters, an indicator of the team contribution needs to be presented to passive voters clearly and visibly. We support the idea of adding the PoC indicator to the wallet directly related to the P-Rep list. If CPF does work in an intended way, it will be much easier to track and evaluate contributions.
In the current IISS 2.0, teams can use your money to work on something only they know, for the salary they choose, with the unknown budget to deliver something they want.
In the current IISS 3.0, teams will seek approval to use your money to work on the project they propose, for the defined salary with a defined budget, to deliver something network needs and approves.