To be clear from the beginning, I don’t have a definite answer or solution to this. Just writing down my thoughts.
Definitely something you would need a strong background in economics (or even tokenomics).
That being said, I want to point out what the actual issue is.
Reward payouts are purely based on delegated stake, so effectively the one and only KPI for any P-Rep to keep an eye on is simply that.
This is the root of all evil. Revenue share within the Top 22 is just free money without any cap, restrictions, or downside.
From what I understand, the only quantitative measurement of actual contribution for any P-Rep is I-Score.
So what I am seeing here is the fact that the one variable (contribution) the ICON network has barely any impact on rewards, while votes are all that is relevant.
By judging human nature, it is clear to me what this leads to.
One idea would be to put a max cap on the “Representative Reward” for everyone as this at least removes the incentive to buy votes after reaching a certain point. Still attractive to kick-start you in Top 22 though.
Another idea would be the necessarily KYC bigger stakes and P-Reps rewards are capped by addresses they are being staked from.
I am just using some arbitrary numbers without putting too much thought in it now. So let’s assume P-Rep buys 1M votes of a whale. Max cap per address is 100k ICX for P-Rep to receive rewards. KYC limit is 20k ICX. Bought votes would need to be either send to 10 KYCed addresses or 50 non-KYCed addresses. It is not a bullet-proof solution, but surely would raise the bar of difficulty to self-stake and especially vote-buying.
Another idea would be to tie proposals and dApps to rewards. There are probably a million ways to do this and a million and one way to exploit this. I don’t know how exactly (yet).
So anyways, these are just thoughts to prove the direction of what I had in mind with “programmable rules”.